Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), caused by the SARS coronavirus, has emerged as a grave public health concern worldwide.[1](#bib1){ref-type="ref"} Due to the potential for nosocomial transmission to patients[2](#bib2){ref-type="ref"} and healthcare workers (HCWs)[3](#bib3){ref-type="ref"} and the ability of SARS to lead to progressive and potentially fatal pneumonia without known effective therapy,[4](#bib4){ref-type="ref"} especially in high‐risk individuals,[5](#bib5){ref-type="ref"} infection containment strategies are of the utmost importance. Recently, a patient suspected of having SARS required hospitalization at our tertiary cancer center (M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, TX).

A 48‐year‐old male with Hodgkin disease in clinical remission presented with 1 day of fever (39.0 °C), nonproductive cough, nasal congestion, headache, and photophobia. His symptoms commenced while he was returning from a trip to Bangkok, Thailand; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Singapore in June 2003. He appeared acutely ill and had a white blood cell count of 4000 cells/μL (lymphocyte count, 960 cells/μL), and a chest radiograph showed interstitial infiltrates in the right lower lobe. Respiratory (nasopharyngeal \[NP\]) samples were evaluated for influenza A and B, parainfluenza, respiratory syncytial virus, human cytomegalovirus, and SARS coronavirus. Moxifloxacin (400 mg) and trimethoprim‐sulfamethoxazole (15 mg/kg) were administered empirically.

On the patient\'s arrival to the emergency center (EC), he promptly was secured in a negative air pressure (NAP) room. A security guard supervised strict compliance to 1) a patient contact log; 2) airborne precautions (N‐95 mask); and 3) contact precautions (double gloves, double gowns, and disposable eye shields). The outer contact layers were disposed of inside the room; the inner layers and eye shields were discarded immediately outside the room. A single nurse was assigned, and the patient was admitted to the NAP room with a ventilation system that was separate from units that housed patients with hematologic malignancies and hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients. Before further use, the EC room first was decontaminated thoroughly with 10% bleach solution and then decontaminated again 12 hours later. The patient\'s spouse visited daily and had restricted institutional access (between the patient\'s room and the parking garage, with the spouse wearing an N‐95 mask). All patient‐contact HCWs were retested for N‐95 mask seal adequacy. Pulmonary consultation was obtained; portable mechanical ventilation and cardiovascular monitoring units were secured. The primary oncologist provided non‐patient‐contact guidance. Influenza A antigen was detected in NP samples, and treatment with amantadine (100 mg) plus oseltamivir (75 mg) was initiated. Nonetheless, due to concerns regarding concomitant infection,[5](#bib5){ref-type="ref"} infection containment measures remained uninterrupted. SARS coronavirus cultures and serology assays yielded negative results; the presence of influenza A serotype H3N2 was confirmed. The patient was discharged 72 hours after admission.

Due to uncertain infectious inoculum and potential airborne routes of person‐to‐person transmission,[5](#bib5){ref-type="ref"}, [6](#bib6){ref-type="ref"} devising effective infection containment strategies is a daunting task, especially at institutions with prominent high‐risk populations. The cautious infection containment approach presented includes 1) designated hospital units with secured ventilation systems; 2) restricted institutional access for patients, family members, and HCWs with prolonged patient exposure; 3) identification of primary and backup teams, including infection control personnel, infectious disease, and pulmonary and critical care physicians and nurses; and 4) continuation of infection control measures until the results of specific SARS coronavirus diagnostic tests become available. These measures may serve as an outline for preventing the potentially devastating nosocomial spread of SARS in centers that provide care for high‐risk patients.
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